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EURASIAN ENERGY PROSPECTS AND
POLITICS : Need For a Fresh Perspective
Mehmet OĞÜTÇÜ
1 The collapse of  communism in Europe and the former Soviet Union has transformed
world geopolitics and energy map. Now that nearly five years have elapsed since the
demise  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  previously  little  known  vast  territory  of  Eurasia  is
forcefully entering the global scene on many fronts in which its energy resources and
associated problems that crop up figure prominently. Access to the region was heavily
restricted under the communists  and only recently  has  Eurasian scholarship become
fashionable  in  the  West.  This  region,  the  boundaries  of  which  is  difficult  to  draw
precisely, encompasses more than twice the territory of the Middle East and compels the
world to rethink the traditional views of its security, political and economic significance,
its power structures and the consequences that current changes portend for the world
energy prospects. The long-term world energy picture is difficult to draw if one ignores
this large energy-rich territory and the strategic challenges that it poses to the Western
world.
2 Energy  has  today  become the  driving  force  of  the  global  economy and,  in  the  next
century,  it  will  no doubt remain the pillar of  economic and social  development.  The
demand for energy is set to increase apace with economic growth in the medium term
and population growth in the longer term. The substantial oil price increases of 1973/74
and 1979/80 had a major impact on fuel substitution, energy conservation and energy
policy and compelled the Western countries to expand their strategic reserves and invest
billions  of  dollars  in  opening  up  new  reserves,  developing  alternative  energies  and
improving end-use efficiency and conservation. However, with the lack of further growth
 in oil/gas prices, interest has gradually waned and now future energy markets are facing
uncertainties arising from energy policies in general and environmental requirements in
particular. These uncertainties call for a rethinking of global/regional energy policies and
the development, to the extent possible of a unified approach.
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3  Hans Morgenthau used to say that in every generation we engage in what he called geo-
cartography.  That  is,  trying  to  put  together  a  new  map  which,  like  all  maps,  is  a
simplification of reality, but helps us understand where we are. We had a map that served
well for 45 years and a new political map has been now shaped in most continents. The
world energy map, too, has been redrawn as a result of the dramatic changes that have
taken over the past five years. The new energy map will, in its final shape, affect the
forces  of  economic  integration,  collective  concepts,  geopolitics  and  security
arrangements. Alter all, let’s not forget that al] the conflicts in recent history were, in one
way or another, related to or even stemmed from energy crisis.
4 During the Cold War years,  Free World access to oil  supplies,  especially those of  the
Middle East, was one of the premier foreign policy interests of the Western world. All of
the recent Middle Eastern confrontations, from the initial Arab-Israeli conflict of 1947
and the first Iranian crisis of 1951-52 to the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Arab-Israeli wars
of 1967 and 1973, have elicited concern about the strategic consequences of losing control
over Middle Eastern oil supplies. With proven reserves of 891 billion barrels, an estimated
field growth potential of 175 billion barrels, and perhaps 547 billion barrels remaining to
be discovered, it is believed that intensive development could sustain current world  oil
production levels well into the next century. However, world oil reserves and resources
are very unevenly distributed. Despite new discoveries in other regions, the countries
with the greatest potential for long-term sustained production and significant increases
in production are located in the Persian Gulf. And the  end of the Cold War bas done little
to diminish the Western interest in the security of the oil supplies from the Middle East.
To the contrary, the dependence  on Middle Eastern oil is projected to grow stronger in
the next decade. The oil  reserves in the region make therefore it inevitable that any
practical change around the Persian Gulf will continue to attract world attention. This
has  indeed  been  a  factor  in  the  region's  internal  politics  since  the  break-up  of  the
Ottoman Empire alter the First World War. The Western oil stakes are simply too high so
that the Middle Eastern countries will not be allowed, in the words of Krapels1, even "to
sort out their own rivalries without substantial Western attention and intervention." It is,
on the other hand, ironic that the Western community of nations, while not hesitating to
wage a costly war in order to keep the Kuwaiti oil fields from changing hands, virtually
ignores the possibility of what may happen in the event of the rich oil and gas fields of
Western  Siberia  (Russia),  Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan  and  Azerbaijan  falling  into
unfriendly, anti-Western hands2.
5 This region has been the world's leading oil producer since 1976. The, sheer extent of the
territory and the apparent site of the potentially recoverable petroleum and gas resource
base make the Eurasian space one of the tomorrow's oil & gas exporting superpowers.
The  outcome  of  the  current  developments  in  Eurasia,  sounding  as  though  the  20th
century version of  the Great  Game is  being replayed among new major  powers,  will
therefore determine the future shape of a vast geography covering the Middle East, the
Balkans, the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia and, by this token, the very security of the
world's  major  supply  areas  of  oil  and natural  gas.  It  is  for  this  reason that  the  EU,
alongside  other  major  Western  powers,  should  speedily  undertake  a  comprehensive
review  of  its  presently  ambiguous  Eurasian  strategy  and  think  over  its  longer-term
interests in the region. There is a pressing need for the formulation of a new EU strategy
encompassing all  aspects  of  its  relationship with the  Eurasian countries  and,  in  this
context, we believe, energy co-operation offers an excellent opportunity. The recently
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concluded Energy Charter  Treaty  may serve  as  an institutional  and legal  framework
within  which further  co-operation  can  be  fostered  and  existing  problems  can  be
arbitrated.
6 For the sake of this article, whenever we mention energy commodities, they should be
taken as referring mainly to oil and gas -- the two precious assets abundantly found in
Eurasia and most sought after in global energy markets. We shall intentionally omit here
other sources of energy in Eurasia, which are by no means negligible by world standards.
It is beyond doubt that the Eurasian region would be among the most strategic in the
world for energy resources as  oil  and gas are set  to be the engines for  the ongoing
economic and political transfor mation in this vast landmass and given that the Western
dependence on imported oil and gas is  likely to increase over the next decades.  The
former Soviet Union had unique wealth of natural energy resources as one of the few
countries capable of satisfying all its energy requirements on a self-sufficient basis. Now
that the disintegration had taken place, most of the oil and gas reserves of the former
Soviet Union are located in Russia; recent estimates of 162 bn barrels of proven, probable
and possible oil reserves in the former Soviet geography assign 137 bn to Russia, 15 bn to
Kazakhstan, 4 bn to Azerbaijan, 3.2 bn to Turkmenistan and 2.8 bn to other countries of
the CIS3.
7 The Caspian Sea, at the center of some of the world's least known states, is growing into a
major oil and natural gas producing region. According to Rob Sobhani of Georgetown
University4, with as much as 50 bn barrels of reserves, the Caspian Sea area, second only
to the Persian Gulf in terms of oil reserves, can become a stable source of oil for the West
over the next forty years. In fart, the Caspian Sea projects are estimated to produce more
than two million barrels per day - equivalent to what the US imports from OPEC's Arab
members and a little less than the total Chinese production. Most regions in the Caspian
either have never been identified or never tapped. Expected economic growth, boosted by
oil and gas export earnings, could spill over and fuel expansion in two of the former
Soviet Union's mort backward regions : Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Caspian Sea,
actually the world's largest lake,  covers 600.000 square km, but the geological region
extends much further. The Caspian Depression reaches across the northern Caspian Sea
into Western Kazakhstan and includes the long producing Russian oil and natural gas
fields of Astrakhan, Orenburg and Volvograd. Another formation crosses the Sea's said-
section,  called the  Northern Caucasian Mangeshlak plate,  encompassing the  fields  of
Azerbaijan  and  Turkmenistan  and  stretching  to  the  Ai-al  Sea.  There  are  numerous
untested structures out in the Caspian Sea; also, deeper horizons offer good prospects5.
Held back during the Soviet times by lack of capital and technology, the fields of the
newly independent Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan hold billions of barrels of
oil and rich reserves of natural gas.
8  Currently, the Newly Independent States (NIS) area ranks seventh in the world in proven
reserves - Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Venezuela and the former USSR,
followed by Mexico and the US. It is estimated that the region contains more than one
third of the world's gas resources. Now that the countries around the Caspian Sea are
independent,  they can better control  their destinies :  They are small  enough for the
Western prospector to find his/her place without having to deal with the overpowering
bureaucracy of Russia. They are also receptive to Western participation in their own local
industries.  As Western companies move toward the arrangement that will  permit the
joint development of these reserves, one question mark looms ever larger - how to get the
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Caspian oil to the world market? The chief problem is shipping the Eurasian oil and gas
exports to the international market over huge distances from a region landlocked by
often unfriendly, rival or unstable suites. The fate of both resource development and the
entire  industrial  base  depends  on  the  development  of  a  secure  and  efficiently-run
network of pipelines that can transport oil and gas to the deep water ports for sale in the
world currencies. Without such pipelines in place, says the Chevron President67, "we will
only have a pipedream. in that region ».
9 We believe that  the end of  the Cold War bas created new opportunities for regional
economic co-operation and integration between Europe and Eurasia,  where energy is
poised to play a pivotal role. In Tact, the former Soviet Union used to cover about 25% of
West European energy imports -in 1988 the Soviet energy deliveries to the OECD area
amounted to about 93 mmt (million metric tones) of  crude oil  and products,  38 bcm
(billion cubic meters) of natural gas, and to 21 mmt of hard Goal - a total of about 140
mmt7. The European Union has since thon become even more vulnerable in its energy
supplies, especially oil and gas supplies, with nearly half of its energy requirements being
now met by imports and this degree of dependence is likely to increase in the longer term
according to the IEA's 1994 World Energy Outlook. Western Europe has about 4% of world
total gas resources, while accounting for about 10% of total consumption in 1992. Despite
a substantial increase in indigenous production, attributable largely to Norway and the
United Kingdom, Western Europe will  increasingly depend on non-OECD gas imports.
There is therefore a danger that the Union might become excessively reliant on a small
number of countries, or even on a single production region, where political stability is at
risk. The natural gas demand of the EU countries is estimated to reach 300 bcm by the
year 2010, compared to the present 220 bcm. This growth of about 35% will mean that the
share of natural gas in Europe's primary energy consumption will rise from 18% to 23% in
the  came  period.  Local  production  of  gas,  now  some  135  bcm,  is  set  not  to  rise
significantly over the next 20 years, increasing to 140 bcm by 2 000, but then falling off to
120 bcm by 2 010.
10 The resulting supply and demand picture for the whole region is therefore likely to entail
net import requirements at about 140 bcm by 2000 and 180 bcm by 20108. The crucial
question is : Where would the new supplies come from? The answer is simple : inevitably
mainly from outside the Western Europe. Currently, just over 20% of continental Europe's
gas  is  supplied  by  the  NIS,  principally  Russia  and  Turkmenistan  (Algeria  is  also  an
important gas supplier; but its stability is shaky and reserve/production ratio is put at 54
years. Norway's expected accession to the EU was likely to further improve the EU's gas
supply situation; but a December 1994 Norwegian referendum postponed accession bid
beyond the next century). Virtually all this gas is piped across former Czechoslovakia and
the Ukraine. However, recent disputes over payment and transit tariffs led to temporary
reductions  in  exports  to  both Western and Eastern Europe.  With Germany and Italy
reliant on NIS gas for more than a third of their supply and Turkey more than 90%, these
disruptions clearly cause major concern in Western Europe. Although the Middle East will
continue to supply most of the growing demand for oil and some natural gas, alternative
supply routes are considered necessary particularly from the viewpoint of energy supply
security.
11 Against this background, where might Turkey's role be found in the complex energy
picture  of  the  Eurasian  world?  Turkey,  standing  as  it  does  at  the  geo-center  of  the
Eurasian world and at the juncture of strategic energy transportation routes, is destined
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to play a critically important rote in any energy trade between the Eurasian (and some
Middle Eastern) suppliers and the European consumers - a rote, which require wisdom,
creativeness  and  strategic  thinking  on  the  part  of  Turkish  leadership  given  the
magnitude of the existing political sensitivities and economic problems in the region. The
pressure on Turkey (a major oil and gas importer itself) from the oil and gas exporting
states of the Caspian region is expected to grow stronger as these countries in need of
hard currency would want to pump as much oil and gas as possible to the world markets.
And the ability of Turkish energy diplomacy in formulating a viable response to this
historic challenge is no doubt to affect profoundly the future course of Turkey's relations,
not only with the West, but also with the Eurasian countries, beyond the 21st century.
12 We shall narrow our focus here mainly to the EU as it is considered to be the biggest
single market in the West for Eurasian energy production. The problem of security supply
at the EU level is a priority matter given that the Union is a major energy consumer in the
international energy arena. (Incidentally, because of a lack of external energy policy, the
EU is not yet a major world energy player). Security of supply is and will, for long time to
come,  remain  a  central  objective  of  any  European  energy  strategy.  The  European
Commission's Energy Commissioner identified four policy pillars9 in this field with the
future security of energy supply topping the lest. Others include the recognition of the
global nature of the energy markets and the international interdependence between all
the major producers and consumers10 -- a strategy, based on market principles (albeit, a
special and a strategy commodity, energy is still one which should be traded according to
market principles) and environmental protection. To this must be added the objective of
improving industrial  competitiveness.  Steps  have already been taken in recent  years
towards achieving these goals by means of specific measures in several areas such as
efficient use of energy, development of the EU's resources,  diversification of external
supplies,  technological development and dissemination of innovation. These measures
now need to be reviewed and supplemented in the light of recent developments, namely
the  completion  of  the  Internal  Energy  Market,  the  opening -up,  economically  and
politically, of Eastern and Central European Countries and the NIS and the Union strategy
to combat C02 emissions.
13 Energy  strategy  undoubtedly  bas  an  increasingly  global  dimension  requiring  global
solutions. It cannot be confined to the national or EU dimension, since the EU countries
depend on external sources for nearly half their energy supplies.  In this context, the
efforts to co-operate with the former Soviet republics, the new Mediterranean policy and
the resumption of negotiations with the Gulf Co-operation Council to establish a free-
trade area need no further elaboration. It is generally acknowledged by energy experts
that the need for an energy chapter in the Treaty on Political Union is more pressing than
ever. The fact remains, however, that member states have still distinct energy markets
with  few  interconnections  and  engage  in  hardly  any  trade  at  all,  for  instance,  in
electricity and natural  gas.  The Commission regards the creation of a free market in
power and gas as one of the Most important elements in creating a single market for
goods and services. Many energy companies have however stubbornly resisted attempts
to open up the market. The factors determining the security of supply and availability of
energy differ markedly. The price differentials for the various energy sources are often
high  for  both  private  and  industrial  consumers  (with  competition obviously  being
distorted as a result). There are also more and more cases of specific energy actions or
proposals dependent on the pursuit of other policy objectives. Examples of this include
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environmental policy (the fight against pollution and the greenhouse effect), support for
crisis-ridden sectors (such as coal or farming) and tax regulations11.  Efforts are being
made by the Commission to foster intra-EU gas and electricity trade.
14 The complex problems surrounding the security of world energy supplies increase the
need for the EU to present a strong united front, not only vis-a-vis the traditional oil and
gas supplying areas, but also vis-a-vis the countries of Eurasia, whose share of the EU
market is likely to increase in the near future, particularly alter the conclusion of the
Energy Charter Treaty negotiations.
15 It bas become obvious that the current and future energy shortfall in the EU cannot be
made up unless some more expansive reserves are mobilized in the traditional areas of
supply, namely Russia. Norway and Algeria. Even so, these will be some requirement for
new sources, but the financial resources needed to bring in such distant gas and oil to
consumer areas are gigantic in comparison with the present financial capacities of the
various partners.  This  shortcoming could be one of  the major  limitations on the EU
economies unless coordinated solutions are sought and found for mobilizing capital and
creating  more  flexible  credit  terms.  To  encourage  the  participation  of  financial
institutions, multilateral and bilateral alike, and oil & gas companies, which will mobilize
all their resources to respond to the new demand, the consumer countries also need to
contribute by being prepared to accept  prices  that  will  provide a  reasonable return,
taking into account the expected higher costs. It seems that the limitations faced today,
notably  financial,  are  likely  to  persist  because  the  number  of  energy  rich  countries
seeking foreign investors is on the increase. It may therefore be necessary to step boldly
beyond the traditional types of co-operation implemented to date and tackle interactive
schemes involving greater solidarity between part ners. Such co-operation, based on a
fairer sharing out of risks and earnings, would provide continuity of interest throughout
oil and gas industries, from production site to consumer areas, and would help to ensure
a better guarantee of secure markets for producers and secure supplies for consumers.
The European Commission White paper and the Brussels European Council (December
1993), the work of the Christophersen Group in the first half of 1994 and the decisions of
the Corfu European Council (June 1994) have successfully enabled the revival of projects
concerning  energy  network.  According  to  the  White  Paper,  investment  in  Trans-
European Energy Networks of ECU 30 billion is needed by the year 2000.
16 It appears that natural gas supplies to the EU area are more or less guaranteed for the
coming decade but alter, the turn of the century, increasing use will have to be made of
distant reserves, including those in the former USSR. Moreover, the consumption of oil
and gas in the NIS, too, already large, will continue to increase. Therefore, in the longer-
term, Europe will have a vested interest in seeing the full exploitation of the large NIS
reserves. The transport of gas over long distances will be profitable only if it is effected in
large volumes and at a continuous rate. The cost of transportation from the Siberian
fields to Western Europe (approx. 5.000km) is difficult to estimate precisely, but a rough
estimate would be in the region of 20 cent/metre3. This is about the same as the price
currently being paid by Western Europe.
17 We now turn to sketching out EU plans on how to respond to its future energy challenge.
There are proposals for a new EU energy policy up to the year 202012, which, if favorably
received by the member states, could lead to the inclusion of energy policy measures
within the Treaty on European Union when it will be revised in 1996. Energy policy was
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deliberately omitted from the Maastricht Treaty with member states (jealous of their
national control) deciding that it was an area best loft to individual countries.
18 The Union is actively developing ideas for energy co-operation on a workable basis with
Central & Eastern Europe and the NIS, conscious of the growing problems in those areas
which could put pressure in future on the world energy markets and particularly on the
former  Soviet  gas  supplies.  And,  on  this  score,  the  European Energy  Charter  Treaty
(though it is no longer a "European" affair in its geographic coverage) deserves a special
mention. It was first proposed in 1990 by the Dutch Government and is known as the
Lubbers Plan with the aim of ensuring that the energy resources indigenous to the West,
which will not last forever, be supplemented by those of Eastern Europe and the NIS. The
fundamental purpose of the Charter is defined as opening up the energy resources of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, encouraging investment and free trade, and
ensuring  reciprocal  access  to  markets,  as  well  as  supporting  transition  towards
democracy  and market  economy.  The  Treaty  negotiated  under  the  European Energy
Charter is destined to become a cornerstone of the future Western energy policy. Just as
the creation of the European Coal and Steel  Community alter the Second World War
become the symbol and the instrument of the ideal of no more war (particularly between
France and Germany), the creation now of an energy union for the whole of Europe (but
also for Such important non-European partners as the US, Japan, Canada and Australia) is
likely to make an important contribution towards preventing new walls from dividing the
old continent in the future. A union of this kind could also serve another general political
aim - that of preventing Europe from becoming too heavily dependent on other parts of
the world for its energy. More importantly, the Energy Treaty may also serve as a useful
framework  within  which  the  controversial  pipeline  projects  could be  brought  to  a
satisfactory conclusion. Going beyond the initial objectives, Eurogas, the European gas
lobby group, called recently for the Energy Charter Treaty to be extended to the Magreb
countries in view of the fart that the EU has become dependent on the Mediterranean for
24% of its total net energy imports (32% of its gas and 27% of its oil imports)13.
19 After a series of meticulous negotiations,  the Charter was signed at the Hague on 17
December 1991 by 48 countries including all the members of the European Union, as well
as the European Commission itself, all the other countries of Western Europe, nearly all
the countries of Eastern Europe and all, except Turkmenistan, of the former USSR, three
countries in the Mediterranean and four major non-European countries of  the OECD,
namely  the  US,  Japan,  Canada  and  Australia.  Since  the  signing  of  the  Charter,  the
participating countries negotiated the Charter's Basic Agreement (now "Charter Treaty")
with a view to providing the legal basis for energy industries' operations and investment
in all signatory countries. The energy sector was chosen for such an ambitious project
because this sector offered the best prospects fur speedy and tangible economic returns
for both sides.  The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),  19-21
November 1990  in  Paris,  also  voiced  its  support  for  the  Lubbers  plan.  The  Treaty
addresses the issues which are crucial for East-West co operation in energy i.e. investment
protection,  non-discrimination,  market -orientated  pricing,  transit,  minimizing
environmental  problems and open trading conditions.  There are,  however,  still  some
fundamental technical difficulties to be resolved. Also, the nature of the negotiations in
progress dues not make things any easier and, above all, the large number of participants
slows things clown. The involvement of the non-European OF-CD countries all too often
transforms the discussions into a negotiation solely between the Western countries14. Last
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but not least, the economic and political instability of the former Soviet Union makes
certain negotiators exceedingly cautious.
20 The negotiators finally agreed in December 1993 to a two-tier approach which was tabled
by the EU, leaving aside the must ambitious and difficult part, namely the pre-investment
protection, of the exercise until a later date. The EU scaled clown its initial ambitions
because the main beneficiaries of the Treaty, the former Soviet republics, were not in a
position to open up its market completely to the exploration of, and drilling for, oil and
natural  gas.  The  new  compromise  envisages  that  the  provisions  on  pre-investment
protection will not be included in the phase I Treaty15. Signatories will negotiate during a
three-year period (beginning January 1995) the conditions under which the principle of
national treatment to the pre-investment phase will apply and which exceptions to the
principle are to be allowed. As a result of these negotiations, the number of exceptions
included in their legislation and considered to be necessary at the time, if any, should be
reduced to a minimum16. Russia decided to sign the Treaty alter last-minute consultations
about trade in nuclear materials and repatriation of investments from Russia. The US
raised a number of objections to the Treaty, which centered on how far the US federal
government can go in committing individual States to treaties which it bas signed. The US
wanted the Treaty text to specify chat the federal government would 'recommend' the
Treaty to individual States but not 'oblige' them to apply it. However, it became clear
during the Treaty negotiations that all  the other participating countries with federal
structures - notably Russia, Canada, Australia and Switzerland - would demand the same
privilege. According to Energy Charter Conference Chairman Charles Rutten, there would
then be no guarantees that the Treaty would be applied, leaving foreign investors with no
certainty whatsoever17.  Other US objections included lack of clarity about freedom of
transfer of funds; definition of a "broad, overriding principle of state sovereignty" which
may undercut the principle of investor protections; fallure to address tax obligations,
particularly at the sub- federal level; and, lastly, denial to the US companies of benefits
from  economic  integration  agreements  enacted  between  the  EU  and  other  Eastern
signatories18. The Treaty, signed by forty-six nations in Lisbon on 18 December 1994 and
expected to be ratified by the end of 1995, will likely bring about the following spin-off
advantages for the West :
21 -- It would first help reduce Western dependence on OPEC for its oil supplies. Although
there is some risk attached to reliance on NIS energy (in the event of high West-NIS
tension or of internal disorder or collapse, supplies would be cut off), this danger should
not be overstated; the NIS have up to now been a reliable supplier of energy to the West,
and are likely to continue to be so if only because they need the hard currency for an al]-
out economic reconstruction.
22 -- Second, the introduction of Western energy technology in the NIS would limit various
environmentally-damaging discharges into the atmosphere (such as leaks of methane and
oil from pipelines) and into soil, rivers and lakes. All the evidences demonstrate that real
progress towards efficiencies  in the NIS and Eastern Europe could quite significantly
reduce world greenhouse gas emissions in the medium term.
23 -- Third, it will give the West better access to NIS energy resources. Access to energy
markets according to GATT rules, even for Charter countries which are not yet GATT
members  will  be  ensured.  This  would  work  in  three  ways.  More  energy  would  be
produced thanks to the introduction of Western technology, Energy efficiency measures
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would lead to a reduction in domestic energy demand, releasing more for export. In the
long term the West could come to depend critically on the NIS's enormous supplies.
24 -- Fourth, it would lock the NIS and other East European countries more closely than
hitherto into the Western financial and trading system. Closer co-operation would open
up the NIS and East European energy sectors to Western companies.
25 -- Finally, freedom of transit for energy products through other Charter countries will be
guaranteed and international arbitration in the case of disputes between governments
and private companies will be possible.
26 It goes without saying Chat the NIS countries need to be reassured from the outset Chat
they would equally benefit from such co-operation and that they would not lose control
over the exploitation of their energy reserves. The following benefits might be identified
from the NIS point of view:
27 -- Greater efficiency of production and consumption would release oil and gas supplies for
export  to  the West,  boosting the NIS's  hard currency revenues;  more hard currency
would in turn enable greater investment in other sectors of the economy.
28 -- Greater efficiency and use of high technology would extend the longevity of reserves
currently being exploited.
29 -- East European and NIS reformers would see an attraction in greater NIS-West economic
interdependence. The energy sector will play a crucial role in the economic restructuring
of three countries and the Energy Charter Treaty will provide the framework for energy
co-operation.
30 -- Better management of NIS energy reserves and consumption would help respond to
growing NIS awareness of its environmental problems.
31 -- Closer integration of the NIS energy sector with that of the West seems very likely also
to contribute to a restructuring of the NIS economies. The expansion of hard currency
outlets for NIS energy production, combined with more active involvement of Western
companies and technology in exploration and exploitation, should increase the pressure
for  a  more  sensible  price  structure,  greater  independence  for  operators  and  better
incentives  for  productivity  and efficiency.  And a  restructuring  of  the  energy  sector,
which of course plays a rote in most NIS economies, is bound to increase the pressure for
a more general economic restructuring along the same lines.
32 -- Also, politically, the best security guarantee for their independence and sovereignty
will  be the presence of the Western business.  The Kazakh President,  Mr. Nazarbayev,
during his official visit to London, made this point quite clear when he said : " I do not
think that in today's world weapons can do anything to protect a country. Our main
security  guarantee  (against  Russia)  will  be  a  powerful  Western  business  presence  in
Kazakhstan. "19.
33 Production of all the key energy commodities - oil, coal, electricity and gas - has declined
in the former Soviet Union since the 1991 collapse and the accompanying political &
economic turmoil. Since 1988, when 626 mmt of oil produced, three bas been a downward
trend in oil production20. In the IEA projections total NIS oil production declines further
before stabilizing in the mid to late 1990s at a level more than 40% below its 1988 peak. It
has  been estimated  that  the  NIS  contains  just  under  40% of  the  world's  known gas
reserves. In 1991, gas represented over 40% of the total energy consumption in the NIS
and accounted for approximately one third of total world gas consumption. To date, gas
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demand bas not  registered the rapid drop that  bas been experienced by other fuels,
primarily because gas supply bas not had the same difficulties as oil. Old style subsidies to
economy in general and to energy industry in particular were reduced or eliminated in all
the republics. The 1992 oil production fell by 13% and gas production by 2.8% That year
energy consumption in the NIS dropped an estimated 6.8%. Against the drop in economic
activity of 19 percent and industrial production of 23% the implicit waste of energy has
not been much better than a year earlier when energy consumption dropped 2 percent
against an economic decline of 10%21.
34 Russian crude oil output totalled 314 mort in 1994 (6.3 mn barrels a day), down 11% from
354.6  mmt produced in  1993  (7.1  mn b/d),  according  to  estimates  from the  Russian
Ministry of Fuel and Energy. For 1995, the Ministry bas forecast a 6% output decline to
295 mmt, the lowest level since the 1970s22.  Even as production has dropped steadily,
exports have grown. In the first 11 months of 1994, shipments outside the former Soviet
territory totalled 87.8mmt (1.0 mn b/d), up 15% from the same period of 1993. Natural gas
production is estimated to total 605.6 bcm in 1994 (1.66 hem a day), clown 2% from 1993.
35 The combined proven reserves of the non-Russian former Soviet republics around the
Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) are estimated at 850 mmt of oil
and 8,700 bcm of gas. Geologists expect more fields to be discovered and think that they
will have to revise reserves estimates upwards as the results from ongoing or planned
exploration programs start coming in. Of the former Soviet republics, only two others
besides Russia -  namely,  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan -produce enough crude oil  to
supply their own refineries and only three (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan)
produce more crude oil than their internal consumption of refined products. But even
Kazakhstan, the second largest oil  producer among the republics,  relied heavily upon
Russia for its own oil supply. Most of the crude run through its refineries was brought in
from Russia (Western Siberia), while most of its crude production was shipped out of the
republic  to  be  refined  in  Russia,  Azerbaijan  and  Uzbekistan.  Furthermore,  its  own
refinery output is not large enough to supply the republic's own requirements for refined
products, necessitating large imports of refined products from the surrounding republics,
mainly Russia.
36 After Western Siberia, Central Asia is the second largest natural gas producing region in
the former Soviet Union, accounting for 17% of total NIS output. Turkmenistan has 25
producing fields, with must of the country's current gas output located in three regions :
the Kopet Dag though along the border with Iran; onshore and offshore along the Caspian
Sea; and along the Amu Darya River. Having an estimated 2.9 trillion cubic meters of
proven gas reserves, Turkmenistan produced 60 bcm of -as and exported 8.5 bcm in 1993
outside the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan's oil reserves are estimated at 16 billion
barrels. The crude oil distribution system in the former USSR was highly integrated and
centrally directed as in other sectors. Like many other former all Union functions, it was
organized without any concern for the republic's borders. For example, there exist no
transfer facilities, such as measuring devices or tank farms, at the border crossings. One
result of this is that data on inter-republic oil flows are quite limited and unreliable23.
37 It is estimated that oil production in the NIS will remain below 8 mn barrels per day until
the mid-1990s. Domestic consumption is expected to follow a similar pattern, allowing
exports from the NIS to remain at approximately their current level of 2.2 mn b/d (of
this, 1.7 mn b/d is exported by Russia)24, even though the crude production fell to 7.8 mn
b/d in 1993 from 9 mn. The fact that Russian exports to destinations outside the republics
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and other former East Bloc nations rose more sharply than expected in 1993 exacerbated
a glutted oil market and contributed to the drop in the world oil prices. NIS natural gas
consumption is also expected to continue expanding and gas exports to Western and
Eastern Europe are forecast to grow over the period to 2010. Given the expected rise in
gas demand in Western Europe, the NIS are likely to be more important as gas producers
to Europe than as oil  producers. In fart,  gas exports may become as important as oil
exports for the NIS in terms of foreign currency earnings.
38 However, on the assumption that the improved economic incentives - through greater
access to the hard currency export market which was granted to Russian producers in
1993 - are maintained in future years, it is expected that declining production van be
stabilized by 1995 at about 7.5 mn b/d, from fields already in production in 1992. This
would represent a 40% decline from the peak of 12.5 mn b/d in 1987 and 1988, according
to  the  IEA estimates25.  The  extensive  known and potential  reserve  base  in  Russia  is
expected to support a steady net increase in NIS production from the late 1990s onwards,
slightly exceeding 10 mn b/d in 2010,  still  well  below the historical  peak of 1987-88.
Production in non-Russian republics, primarily Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is likely to
rise faster than Russian output between 1995 and 2000, reaching 1.5 mn b/d (that is,
17.5% of NIS production), by the turn of the century, compared to 1.1 mn b/d (under 10%)
in 1990. The NIS are the mort gas intensive region of the world, with gas accounting for
nearly 40% of its primary energy consumption. It might be useful to highlight the basic
features  of  the  current  energy  situation in  the  Eurasian economies,  borrowing from
various IEA assessments:
39 -- a high dependency on a single energy source and the need to improve its use as well as
identify energy alternatives to meet growing electricity demand;
40 -- a high dependency on a single foreign supplier of oil and natural gas;
41 --  weak  management  structures  and  inefficient  use  of  energy,  not  only  for  power
generation and other energy industries, but by industries such as steel and cement which
are themselves in urgent need of modernization;
42 --  unacceptable  levels  of  pollution and other  environmental  consequences  of  energy
production and consumption, including problems of nuclear safety; and -- artificially low
energy prises, which, while on the whole, higher now than last year, still do not reflect
world market.
43 Political wrangling, which followed the Soviet disintegration, contributed its share to this
bleak energy situation. The moves towards political independence from Russia by the
Eurasian republics have had to be paid for at  a high economic price.  New trade and
payment  barriers  have  deprived  the  region  of  the  full  benefit  of  comparative  trade
advantages of each republic. Under these circumstances, the integrated system of oil and
gas  pipelines,  as  well  as  the  electric  power  system,  suffered  disruptions  and  higher
operational and capital costs. In awareness of these dangers, energy officials from Russia
and the other republics tried to maintain as much co-operation as possible. In early 1992
the  governments  of  Russia,  the  Ukraine  and  Belarus  decided  to  form  a  joint  stock
company for inter- republican gas movements. All the former Soviet republics, with the
exception of Turkmenistan, Latvia and Estonia, have applied for membership. In March
1993 top officials from the 12 republics formed a new "Inter-Governmental Council for Oil
and Gas" in the Siberian town of Surgut with the aim of improving cooperation in oil and
gas production, transport, pricing and investment. The Surgut conference, although it
EURASIAN ENERGY PROSPECTS AND POLITICS : Need For a Fresh Perspective
Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, 19 | 2004
11
failed to resolve all contentious issues, at least appeared to recognize the high degree of
interdependence that exists between the republics. In terms of natural gas, for example,
the Ukraine depends on Russian gas for most of its consumption, while 90% of Russian gas
must pass through the Ukraine.
44  The interdependent nature of the former Soviet gas and oil industries suggests that a
compromise solution would he in the best interests of  all  parties Involved.  However,
critical questions on prices and transit rights still remain to be resolved. Increasingly,
economic  relations  among the  former  Soviet  republics  continue  to  be  dominated by
issues surrounding the supply of fuels and electricity particularly given the trend towards
liberalized energy prises internally, as well as the prospect that energy imports will be
settled  in  convertible  currency.  Economic  interdependence  among  the  republics,
particularly in the energy sector,  proved to be a key element in the desire of  many
republics for some type of cohesion in the post-Soviet period, reflected in the formation
of the CIS. The possible break-up of the CIS structure will disrupt entire energy system,
including the flow of crude oil and gas over the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Taking advantage of its relatively strong position, Russia wants to retain its final say over
all CIS energy issues, holding in its hand a Sword of Damocles over the heads of other
republics  -  an  attitude,  which  give  rise  to  fears  of  the  possible  revival  of  Russian
imperialism in the region. The dispute between Russia and the Ukraine is particularly
illustrative in this respect. Kazakhstan bas recently been subjected to strong political and
economic pressure from Russia, which has demanded an equity share in Kazakhstan's
giant Karachaganak natural gas field and is also laid to be seeking a stake in the rich
Tenghiz  oilfield26.  The  latest  attempt  by  Russia  to  prevent  Western  companies  from
investing in Azerbaijan oil industry was detailed in an 28 April letter from its Foreign
Ministry in which it demanded the right to reject Caspian Sea oil projects that its former
Soviet neighbors are negotiating.  It  appears that the Eurasian states are coming to a
point,  where the avoidance of  such a mutually harmful  confrontation in the field of
energy may not be easy.
45 Private and government backed energy investment in the NIS area in 1992 remained, at
$150mn, fairly insignificant. Both rides recognize that the oil sector is the most urgent
area for foreign co-operation and investment. However, in the absence of a sound legal
basis for such undertakings, foreign involvement did not go beyond relatively small pilot
projects and feasibility studies. Joint ventures in oil production produced 5 mort in 1992
and were expected to rise to 10 mort in 1993. The World Bank, the EBRD and the US and
Japanese Export- Import Banks are now discussing the first loans for the oil  sector in
Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The World Bank reports, in a new study27, a "radical
shift in the pattern of external financing flows to developing countries in the early 1990s,
from debt to equity financing and from bank to non-bank sources. Commercial bank loans
have  been  replaced  by  bond  and  equity  portfolio  flows  and  greater  foreign  direct
investment".  Meanwhile,  the  major  oil  companies  will  continue  to  be  largely  self-
financing. Despite self-financing and the shift away from debt financing, the view that
financing is the new bottleneck in energy projects has many followers. In short, the world
is resource rich, but capital short. Oil producers will therefore increasingly have to seek
non-traditional sources of finance. Many oil and gas projects are competing with one
another for a limited international money pool. In the final analysis, money will no doubt
flow  to  the  most  profitable  and  safe  energy  investments.  Since  the  over-intensive
development policies pursued by the central government created severe environmental
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problems in all the Eurasian republics and unbearable strains were placed on the fragile
ecological balance of the region, which led to various forms of dysfunction, environment-
related investment financing is also becoming important.
46 Iran throws its full weight behind Eurasia's oil and gas deals for its perceived regional
ambitions. It offers them its energy technology & experience and geography. The Iranian
Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Ali  Akbar Velayati,  visited Central  Asia's  major capitals  several
times, trying to finalize agreements for exporting oil, gas and other commodities through
Iranian ports. To lure this business, Iran promised to spend $1.5 bn to complete a railroad
between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf and is said to be talking to some Western
bankers about financing several new oil and gas pipelines. Iran's Finance Minister, Mr.
Mohsen  Nourbakhsh,  estimates  an  annual  trade  of  $10  bn  with  the  former  Soviet
republics once the new facilities are built28.  Iran, exploiting its geography advantages,
drags its feet in allowing Turkish trucks to cross its territory on their way to Central Asia,
and gives mixed signals on whether it will ever agree to accommodate an Azerbaijan-
Turkey pipeline29 - even if the Western (basically the US) objection will be overcome to a
cross-Iran  route.  Iran  is  being  portrayed  as  a  country-weight  to  Ankara's  growing
influence in the region, while Ankara feels it necessary to underline that it  is not in
competition for regional primacy with any country. However, there are recent assertions
that, in the face of an increasingly hostile Russia, starting to flex its still considerable
muscles  in  Central  Asia  and  the  Caucasus,  Turkey  and  Iran  may  be  burying  their
differences and a convergence of strategic interests is emerging. A there-day official visit
by the Iranian Vice-President, Mr. Hasan Hahihi, in December 1993, resulted in a series of
agreements30: agreement was reached in principle on a tripartite meeting between Iran,
Turkmenistan  and  Turkey  about  transporting  natural  gas  to  Europe  via  Turkey;  the
extension  of  the  Trans-European  Motorway  network  as  far  as  Iran;  the  lifting  of
obstructions facing Turkish trucks carrying goods to Central Asia via Iran; and building a
railway service between Lake Van and Iran and Central Asia.
47 Iran is bidding for a catalyst role in regional energy co-operation. Early 1992 it held a
summit  conference of  the Caspian Sea leaders,  which led to  the announcement  of  a
Caspian trade grouping, incorporating all the riparian states. Aware of the importance of
energy in the region, Iran moved fast to conclude energy deals with most of the former
Soviet states early in 1993, including separate initial agreements with the Ukraine and
Turkmenistan to build pipelines in order to export Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe.
As part of its overall strategy, Iran also agreed in April 1992 to supply four to five million
tones of crude oil and 25 bcm of gas each year to the Ukraine. Azerbaijan, too, wants to
buy three to four bcm of gas a year from Iran to offset ruts from Turkmenistan.
48 Tehran is planning to modernize all its major ports in what appears to be part of its plan
to become the gateway to the republics of Central Asia. In 1992 the government spent
about $22 mn to expand and renovate the country's ports31. Observers indicate that if Iran
succeeds in its bid to act as a doorway to the republics,  it  stands to gain significant
revenues  from  goods  passing  through  its  territory.  Tehran  bas  been  negotiating  an
agreement to handle shipping to Kazakhstan, the largest and richest of the Central Asian
republics:  the  two  count ries  already  agreed  to  begin  work  on  linking  their  railroad
networks for facilitating the transportation of cargo to, and from, the Gulf port of Bandar
Abbas.
49 The decision by Azerbaijan to offer Iran a quarter of its 20 percent overall share in the
$7.4 billion project to develop Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea - reportedly in exchange
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for providing financing and for counter-balancing Russia - bas sent shock waves through
the Western consortium members. Iran agreed to fund energy projects in the Azerbaijani
enclave of Nakhichevan as part of this agreement with Baku. Iran is also to fund an oil
pipeline construction project there32, build a refinery with an annual capacity of 500.000
tones and an electricity system.
50 Tehran was one of the first countries setting up air links with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan  and  Kazakhstan  and  is  now  in  the  process  of  integrating  road  and  rail
networks in an ambitious drive to link the region with the Gulf  and to international
shipping33.  Iranian strategists  are well  cognizant of  the fact  that  whoever provides a
transit route will have greater influence over the course of events in that region. Iran is
reportedly  campaigning  for  the  establishment  of an  international  organization  of
producers  and exporters  of  natural  gas  along lines  of  the  OPEC.  The  creation of  an
alliance led by Iran of oil producing countries from the Caspian Sea region is also under
consideration.
51 It appears that Japan is yet to fully flex its economic muscles in Eurasia, although several
Japanese companies already started operating, on a relatively small scale, in the region.
The Japanese National Oil Corporation announced that it would launch a feasibility study
for the commercial  production of  oil  and natural  gas in the Central  Asian republics.
Seeking a stable alternative to Middle Eastern oil, the corporation hopes to obtain drilling
rights  and  establish  a  large- scale  joint  venture  with  local,  Japanese  and  major
international oil companies34. Japan is also considering how to cope with the problem of
transporting natural gas and oil from Central Asia to Japan. One plan would be to export
oil and natural gas to other former Soviet republics or European countries and then swap
them for oil and gas produced closer to Japan, as in Southeast Asia. Japan's first attempts
to explore its  interest  in the region dates bock to May 1992,  when the then Foreign
Minister, Mr. Michio Watanabe, visited the region. On a follow-up mission, a high-level
Finance Ministry delegation toured the region in October 1992. Business groups followed
suit.
52 The Central Asian republics link Asia and the Middle East and it seems
53 The Central Asian republics link Asia and the Middle East and it seems that Japanese
officials  returned  from  the  region  impressed  by  cultural  affinities.  Japan's  current
strategy towards Eurasia dues not seem clearly defined. It is loosely coordinated, with
different ministries pursuing separate agendas, though the Foreign Ministry seems to be
in the lead. But Tokyo nonetheless took a series of steps that set the stage for becoming
the dominant aid donor to the region. A key decision came in December 1992 when Japan
managed  to  put  the  five  Central  Asian  republics  on  the  Development  Assistance
Committee (DAC) list of the OECD. The DAC is a group of Western donor countries, which
together provide more than $75 bn (1993) worth of official development assistance to
developing countries. It will now be possible for Tokyo to register its assistance flows to
the region as official development aid. Japan has also been leading a drive to admit the
Eurasian republics to the Asian Development Bank, even though they are already
members of the EBRD. Reports indicate that Japan is about to complete its drive to open
embassies in all of these republics35.
54 Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MIT[), in a white paper on energy
policies36,  noted rising opportunities for oil  development for Japanese oil  exploration
companies as a result of open policies adopted by these countries. However, Japanese
upstream companies continue to lag behind major Western oil companies in terms of the
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number (if concessions, funds and technology because they have been in existence for a
shorter period of time and act slowly & overcautiously. In articulating a future energy
policy, MITI posits that natural gas should be established as the basic of Japanese energy
source with a view to cutting its dependency on oil and reducing the emission of harmful
gases. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Hosokawa, made a proposal during the APEC
Seattle meeting in November 1993 to the effect that APEC should devise an Action Plan to
address the general  "tripartite" relationship between the three Es,  namely:  economic
growth, environment and energy security. The Action Plan was approved at APEC's Bogor
Summit in November 1994.
55 Central  Asian  natural  resources  and  China's  Tarim  Basin  figure  prominently  in  any
Japanese  strategy  towards  Eurasia.  According  to  press  reports,  there  are  some
preliminary thoughts on transporting Central Asian oil and gas, via China, to Japan. The
"Silk Route" energy project chat involves Japan, China and Eurasia is a mixture of energy
politics and economics. At the present time, Japan is measuring the maximum benefit the
country can secure, by either : (i) helping Russian Far East oil and gas development; or (ii)
by supporting Turkmenistan gas development along with China's Tarim Basin oil and gas
development. In effect, the Silk Route projects lifeline will ultimately depend on Japanese
financing. White the decision will be a market-oriented one, political consideration will
be fully reflected as well. A casual reader of Japanese affairs may be forgiven for thinking
that it is not only on account of sources of energy that Tokyo is taking a keen interest in
the Eurasian world -- strategic concerns to counterbalance two countries, namely Russia
and China, through active engagement in the region, as well as cultural affinities all bear
a considerable impact upon the current Japanese approach vis-a-vis this part of the globe.
56 Over the course of  the next  decade,  China is  expected to  out-perform the economic
achievements of the 'Arian Tigers' by a substantial margin. Development of the country's
energy resources will therefore be an urgent and essential task if the momentum for such
an economic drive is  to be maintained.  Much has been written in early 1980s about
China's emergence as a potential oil power. Comparisons have ranged from those that
pictured China as another Middle East with a Middle East-like impact on future global oil
markets, to more modest images of an oil-producing country that can meet its rapidly
expanding domestic needs through the 1990s and still have some oil for export to its
neighbors, particularly Japan. Yet, to fulfil even the latter prediction, China will have to
surmount a series of substantial  political,  financial  and technical  obstacles37.  China is
today under increasing pressure to make significant new oil discoveries if it is to avoid, in
such a  high growth period,  becoming a  net  crude  oil  importer  in  the  nid-1990x,  or
perhaps even before. Its proven reserves at the end of 1980 stood at 3.2 billion tones or 24
billion barrels. However, estimates of proven and potential reserves vary, but mort China
experts believe the country has a maximum of 5.3 billion tones (39 billion barrels) in
onshore reserves and around 4 billion tones (29 bn barrels) in offshore reserves, giving a
total of 9.3 bn tones (68 bn barrels). In 1991, China's oil production reached an estimated
137 mmt. Customs figures show that China exported 19.43 mmt of crude oil in 1993, down
from 21.51 mmt in 1992 and imported 15.64 mmt, down from 11.36 mmt38.
57 The Chinese government announced that its GNP growth of about 10% in 1994 would push
up demand for  oil  and oil  products  which could not  be met by local  output.  So the
opportunity should be taken with oil prices currently at their five-year low to import a
large quantity of crude and develop its petrochemical industry. it has already become a
net importer in 1994. In the longer term (beyond the year 2000), the future of China's oil
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industries lies in the north-west regions adjacent to the borders of the Eurasian republics.
Recent  exploration  for  oil  in  the  Tarim  Basin  in  the  far  western  Muslim-populated
Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous region yielded significant finds. Extensive seismic surveys,
conducted over the past  few years  by foreign contractors  including the BP,  NIPPON,
ITOCHU, MITSUBISHI and MITSUI revealed many structures scattered over this vast area,
including some of remarkable size. One of them, the Tazhong, in which oil was found in
1989, is the largest in China, covering an area of 12 mn acres. Recognizing the fart that
foreign investment and technology will be necessary in order to achieve their economic
aims and to make China self supporting in oil, the Chinese government adopted a more
open  policy  and  international  bidding  was  already  opened  for  the  there  massive
prospects in the west, mainly the Junggar, Turpan and Tarim basins. The first round of
bidding attracted 68 foreign firms from 17 countries. These regions together produced
8.77 mmt of oil in 1992, one mmt up on 1991, plus 700 mcm of gas.
58 The potential for increasing production is immense, bearing in mind the fact that known
reserves  of  those  basins  come to  nearly  10  billion  tones  of  oil39.  (Chinese  geologists
estimated that the geological reserves of the Basin could be as much as 74 bn barrels of oil
and 7.9 trillion cm of natural gas40).  There are also rumors that China saved the hest
blocks on the Tarim Basin for itself, offering only the less promising ones to western
companies. As already mentioned, there exists a Japanese proposal to run a pipeline all
the way through the Kazakhstan border to the eastern seaboard of China, which would be
6.500 km long. Its feasibility is still under consideration. There is evidence that this could
be of interest to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, both seeking alternative routes to their
gas exports. China bas the potential to swallow a large portion of gas and oil from Eurasia.
Transporting the Tarim oil and gas on a Eurasian pipeline to the international markets is
also  under  serious  consideration.  Given  this  situation  and  its  known  geo-strategic
interests in Eurasia, it would not be an exaggeration if one argued that China, a major
player in the region, will continue to take an increasingly strong interest in the Eurasian
energy prospects and do the best it can to shape the course of events there. In 1992 the
presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan all visited Beijing
one alter another and, in return, the Chinese Premier, Mr. Li Peng, toured all the Central
Asian capitals in April 1993 to intensify co-operation with their "new" neighbors. In his
speeches he regularly affirmed China's interest in stability and security in the region. To
respond to China's security concerns, President Nazarbayev explicitly committed himself
to preventing advocates of an "East Turkestan Republic" from working against China and
interfering in Xinjiang from the territory of Kazakhstan41.
59 We should not pass without acknowledging such important actors in the Eurasian energy
puzzle as Pakistan, Afghanistan42, India and South Korea, which proved difficult for us to
cover properly due to the lack of sufficient information about their role in the region's
energy business.
60 Seizing the opportunities and coping with the challenges in Eurasia  require the best of
geopolitical  analysis,  market intelligence,  skill  in cultural  adaptation and an effective
local partner. But, in some cases, success may depend on a far-sighted strategic alliance.
This brings us to Turkey, a country that is not only situated at the crossroads of Europe,
Western Asia, the Middle East the Caucasus and North Africa, but is also at the junctions
of various new currents and different civilizations. From Brussels, Turkey is still a newly
industrializing country with many Domestic problems,  well  behind the economic and
political development of the EU; but seen from Tashkent or Baku, it is a dynamic regional
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power. Turkey's presence in Eurasia has been strongly felt since the demise of the Soviet
Empire in many areas including the energy sector.
61 In recent years, Turkey bas achieved record economic growth - in 1993, its GDP grew by
over 7%, despite the long-standing recession in Europe, Economic growth meant surging
demand for energy, notably oil and natural gas, Energy demand is forecast to soar by
148% from a projected 62.3 million tones of energy (TOE). in 1994 to 155 mn toe in 2010,
according to the Turkish Ministry of Energy. This will be met largely by a rapid increase
in imports of natural gas, and an ambitious power station construction program. Its ten-
year energy investment program requires an investment of $32 billion, which will  be
financed through privatization of existing energy utilities43. Turkey's heavy dependence
on oil imports will increase radically by 2010. Domestic crude output of 4.1 million tones
met only 16.8% of demand in 1993. On the basin of current known reserves, it will dwindle
to 299,000 tones in 2010 (most rapidly between 2003 and 2010), sufficient only to meet
0.75 % of projected total demand of 39.6 million tones44,unless major new reserves are
discovered. The national oil  company, TPAO, produces just over three-quarters of the
total,  while  foreign  operators,  such  as  Shell  and  Mobil,  produce  the  rest.  Domestic
production  is  likely  to  deteriorate  in  the  shorter  term  because  of  the  increase  in
separatist  terrorist  activities  in  the  southeastern  region  of  the  country.  In  1992,  oil
provided 46.6% of the total demand and gas's share rose to 8.2% from 1991's 7.8%. In 1993,
the country imported, according to preliminary figures, some 19.65 mmt of crude oil, up
somewhat on 1992 as indigenous production continued to drop. Demand for imported
natural gas is projected to increase from around 4.6 bcm in 1992 to 30 bcm in 2010, with
the prime consumers expected to be industry and power plants. Within a couple of years,
gas should be providing 15%45 of primary energy demand, double that of its contribution
three years ago. Deliveries already lined up from Russia, Qatar and Algeria; more could
follow if new transit lines from Turkmenistan were established. Thus, a reduced share for
oil  is  anticipated in total  energy consumption.  Fuel  oil  is  giving way to gas and will
increasingly lose market share as new hydro-electric and coal-fired power plants come
into use.  To meet  the  growing energy demand,  the  government  has  mapped out  an
ambitious  power  station  construction  program  up  to  2010,  comprising  47  thermal
stations, 100 hydro-electric plants and two nuclear power station. 
62 Planners in Ankara claim that, besides being a major energy importer itself, Turkey could
become a viable bridge for the East-West trade in energy, such as oil and gas from Central
Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East bound for Europe, and provide an oil refining
center for the EU, comparable with those of Italy and Spain. Spain. Ankara is also trying
to get help from the US, the EU, Japan and the rich Gulf Co-operation Council states in
making the Black Sea zone a viable common market, with Turkey thus having important
advantages as a transit route for  all kinds of products and services. Turkey has some
attractions  for  Western  oil  &  gas  companies,  exploration  and  production  aside.  In
particular, the country is increasingly perceived as a jumping-off point for investment
and trade activities in the Eurasian republics, many of which offer promising oil and gas
prospects as highlighted earlier. Communications with these countries are relatively good
and the Turkish government has made efforts to cement economic as well as political ties
with these republics. The state-owned corporations, namely TPAO and BOTAS, have been
employed as new instruments of Turkey's active energy diplomacy. Turks already signed
various energy accords with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. For centuries,
Turkey has been a hub between Europe and Asia and today she wants to serve as a trans-
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continental bridge. When it was just a question of providing an oil outlet for Iraq, there
was no problem; then,  Iran entered the scene,  with the idea of  sending gas through
Turkey  into  Europe  -  a  situation  which  calls  for  as  delicate  a  piece  of  diplomatic
manoeuvering  as  anything  dreamed  up  at  the  height  of  the  Byzantine  Empire.  The
Turkish  contribution  has  therefore  become  an  important  part  of  any  plan  for
transporting the Eurasian oil and gas to Europe. The United States has notified several
governments  in the region that  it  would endorse construction of  a  pipeline through
Turkey to carry future oil production from the Caspian region. A similar situation may
arise  as  regards  the  Middle  Eastern  gas,  too,  when  the  Arab-lsraeli  peace  prevails
eventually in the region.
63 Strange things are happening in the world of pipeline politics as a result of the continued
political and military uncertainties in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Efforts
to find new alternative export routes for crude oil from the Eurasian republics that would
avoid Russia now appear to be in abeyance. The current network of oil and natural gas
pipelines that serves the former Soviet Union is immense. The Soviet Union had built up
an integrated gas supply network stretching over a distance of some 215.000 km46, more
than half of which is made up of large diameter trunklines. The Soviet pipeline system
was designed to transport some     800 mmt of crude oil annually (about 16 mn b/d), with
an export capacity of around 124 mmt (2.5 mn b/d). The bulk of the system was laid
during the last two decades, but pipelines are falling to survive anywhere near as long as
their target 25-year lifespan. In Russia alone, 6.500 km of line and compressors need
reconstruction. The single mort important reason for this widespread decay is that the
Soviets laid pipelines without corrosion protection47. So, for the West, the construction of
new gas pipelines from Eurasia seems to be one of the priority issues.
64 Crude oil trunklines stretch over a distance of more than           60.000 km48,  including
sections of the system that run into former COMECON countries in Eastern and Central
Europe. The continued closure of the Adria pipeline, which has not been operational since
September 1991 as a result of war in former Yugoslavia, thwarted the initial efforts of
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to buy oil from other sources. Poland is having
the  greatest  success  diversifying  supply  routes,  including  shipping  Iranian crude  via
Gdansk to its inland Plock refinery, which used to rely solely on Soviet crude deliveries
through the Druzhba pipeline. Poland has gone from near total dependence on Russian oil
in 1989 to a situation, where it is now purchasing nearly two-thirds of its import needs
from other suppliers. In terms of gas trade, Eastern Europe still does not have any sources
of supply other than the former Soviet Union. It has, however, decreased imports from
Russia by 15% between 1989 and 1992. Since the bulk of the region's oil and gas originates
from the Russian fields, the main web pipelines is concentrated on Russian territory.
65 Unfortunately, much of the system is old and in urgent need of rehabilitation, or in some
cases,  of complete replacement. Even the more recent additions system often require
immediate repair, as they have been built too quickly and without necessary insulation.
Accidents to pipelines are frequent, causing damage to the environment and disruption
to  the  economic  activities.  Several  banks,  including  the  EBRD,  the  World  Bank  and
investment banks such as JP Morgan and Japan's Daiwa showed interest in participating
in the rehabilitation and expansion of the Russian natural  gas transmission network.
Huge amounts of capital will be needed to finance the construction of new export lines
planned for Western Siberia and the Russian Far East; but finding foreign investors and
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lenders for oil pipelines will probably be very difficult, as long as confusion continues
about the ownership of oil resources and the most economical and politically stable route.
66 The Eurasian republics with large oil and gas resources of their own are no wonder in a
hurry to find new ways to move their oil and gas quickly and safely to world markets.
Republics with fewer energy resources are also
67 exploring  new  transport  possibilities  as  a  means  of  reducing  dependence  on  the
increasingly unreliable Russian oil and gas supplies, particularly after the Zhirinovsky
Phenomenon caused widespread discomfort in the former Soviet sphere. 1t seems that
pipeline plans in the NIS will continue to proliferate as the political situation becomes
more complex. To a large extent they are not only planned in anticipation of higher
export  demand,  but  basically  as  alternative  routes  avoiding certain  transit  countries
which could potentially create political problems.
68 Since domestic funds are not available, projects which can find foreign co-financing have
the best  chances  of  success.  But  foreign investors  need to  be  convinced that  export
demand will be growing in the longer run and/or that the cost for alternative pipelines
are a premium worth paying for enhanced security of oil and gas supplies. To find foreign
funds for new oil  pipelines is  difficult.  Given the size and flexibility of the world oil
market, long-term supply security considerations are hard to sell to Western oil buyers.
Funds  can  only  come  from  foreign  companies  having  a  considerable  share  in  local
production. As long as these shares are as small as they are because of the legal and
political risks perceived, foreign involvement in oil pipelines is bound to be insignificant
as well. Only if the risks can be eliminated to a large extent, would foreign oil company
participation in new oil  pipelines reach,  according to some optimistic forecast,  up to
$10bn. The international oil and gas industry is already acutely aware that companies
involved in major projects need to ensure a way out of the former Soviet Union for their
oil  and  gas  production  to  be  viable.  Oil  output  from Chevron Corp.'s  giant  Tenghiz
development  in  Kazakhstan  bas  been  throttled  back  because  of  inadequate  pipeline
facilities. A recently agreed-upon $9 billion petroleum project in Azerbaijan also needs to
settle on a pipeline route before a western consortium led by British Petroleum Co. and
Amoco Corp.  will  begin major  investment and development.  However,  negotiating to
invest billions of dollars in new pipelines also is difficult in a region fraught with political
uncertainty. Western oil companies have sometimes found themselves competing with
domestic companies,  who either seek control of transport facilities or oppose them49.
Moreover, Western companies have found that they have been expected to make most of
the investment in return for a less-than-proportional stake in the facilities (as in the
Chevron vs Caspian Pipeline Consortium case).
69 At first sight, the break-up of the USSR appeared to be an answer to Turkey's prayers. The
Eurasian  states  have  a  great  deal  in  common with  Turkey50.  Some share  a  common
religion. They also share much of the same linguistic and ethnic heritage. Initially, high
expectations were raised in the public that contacts between Turkey and the Eurasians
would boom all of a sudden since the people of these republics were mostly of Turkic
origin,  speak  a  language  similar  to  Turkish  and  had  a  common  heritage  of  Islamic
tradition. As time passed by, it became evident that these common values could not be
the only factors in bolstering Turkey's political and economic ties with them. This does
not of course mean that Turkey is not in a more advantageous position than many other
countries.  Turkey  has  encountered  serious  geographical  problems  as  it  has  tried  to
develop relations with Eurasia. These have principally related to issues of access. Turkey
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has  tried  to  neutralize  this  disadvantage  of  geography  by  seeking  to  develop  non-
terrestrial  communications,  putting  emphasis  on  the  development  of  a  modern
telecommunications network, and encouraging air transport routes. The prevailing view
is that Ankara's role as a regional power can be enhanced only if Turkey properly assesses
existing realities and predict future developments, refraining from mistakes that an over-
emotional approach would causes51.
70 Agreement has been finally reached that Turkmen gas would transit Turkey on its way to
markets in Western Europe via the Balkans. The Turkmen President, Mr. Saparmurad
Niyazov, confirmed this accord in Davos and in Ankara last year. At a time when Turkey's
natural gas needs are expected to hit 20 bcm by the year 2000 with its production at 200
mcm, it is hardly surprising that Ankara bas intensified its negotiations with Russia52, its
traditional supplier of natural gas, and has brought in new partners - namely, Georgia,
Qatar and Turkmenistan for fresh supplies. Gas plans for Turkmenistan to Europe via Iran
and Turkey are now on the back burner, just like the Azerbaijan pipeline deal, until the
war  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  is  resolved  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  the  parties.
Representatives from Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Turkey came together
in Ankara in January 1995 to solve the problem of financing the project. But, at the end of
the meeting, the members of the consortium remained as vague as ever on how the gas
pipeline, the cost of which is estimated at between $ 5 and $ 6 br, would be proneed.
Aware of Western reservations about Iran, Turkey has proposed that it could take as the
responsability of bringing the pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey via Iran. Ankara
wants to assure coordination between Turkey, Iran and Turkmenistan, the "three main
parties". An optional route exists through Bulgaria and Hungary, but for most suppliers a
route around the north of the Black Sea would be even simpler. However, central and
north  European  markets  are  already  awash  with  gas  offers  (Russian,  Dutch  and
Norwegian gas), while supplies from Central Asia would barely be competitive over such a
long distance.
71 More attractive would be perhaps the southern option, through Greece, across the Ionian
Sea and into Southern Europe via Italy. The problems there are partly technical, although
the sea crossings are fairly straightforward; but politics once more may pose a problem,
given the long-standing antipathy between Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, Greece, too
wants to become a transit center of an expanded energy network linking the EU with Iran
and the former Soviet Union through Turkey. The Greek Industry Minister, Mr. Costas
Simitis, said that "extending energy transport networks eastward would change Greece
from a regional station to a basic strategic junction for Europe's energy system"53.  He
rightly fears that if Greece falls to place itself at the center of such a network, the link
between Europe, Italy and the East would be made through its neighbors in the north and,
as a result, "Greece would bear the political, economic and energy repercussions of being
left out". Leaving aside the argument whether Greece could be a 'strategic junction' in
energy  transportation,  we  should  consider  the  positive  implications  politically  and
economically of such co-operation on the traditionally tense relations between Turkey
and  Greece.  In  May  1994,  at  the  initiative  of  the  European  Commission's  SYNERGY
program, Greece hosted a conference entitled "New Energy Realities in the Black Sea
Region" and displayed keen interest in facilitating contacts between the EU and Eurasia.
Energy co-operation bas been one of the most promising themes within the framework of
the Black Sea Economic Co-operation. Given that Turkey's need for gas is predicted to rise
to 12.5 bcm a year by 1996 and, according to longer -term predictions, reach around 30.6
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bcm a year by 2010,  it  seems like there has been some considerable hard diplomatic
bargaining  behind  the  scenes  and  Russia  did  not  make  any  attempt  to  block  the
construction of the $7 billion Turkmen gas export line, via Iran and Turkey. With Turkey
as the initial consumer until European demand justifies the extension of the line beyond
Ankara, the line should be capable of delivering 10-15 bcm a year, perhaps rising to 28
bcm a year54 thereafter, if justified.
72 Against this background, what is certain is that any energy route destined to Europe
should consider crossing Turkish territory if it will be viable and, for the proposed gas
trunkline to be profitable, according to experts, its capacity will have to be over 25 bcm
per year. This means shedding volume all the way, since no one country at the end of a
2.000-3.000 miles long pipeline is going to take that sort of supply risk. Turkey is seen as a
first drop-off point. That will suit Ankara, switching its industry and housing to natural
gas, if fees and prices were right. But both depend on sales further along the system and
sales depend on security, something that will always be in doubt. More importantly, all
the pipeline plans depend on resolution of political solutions to the age-old problems.
Relations within and between the former Soviet republics must also be sorted out and the
fighting in former Yugoslavia sits like a massive roadblock across everything. In the light
of this situation, Mollet argues55 that "only a gambling banker is going to lend money for
billion-dollar projects running through Eurasia". From the private investors' short-term
commercial perspective, he may be right; but long-term energy security and geo-political
considerations will certainly be at work in making the fateful assessment.
73 Turkey's  modest  oil  ventures  know  that  they  cannot  compete  against  major  oil
multinational corporations. An early concession in Kazakhstan won by Turkey's BMB, a
small  engineering  concern  with  little  oil  experience,  fell  flat  and  was  hurriedly
transferred to the state-owned TPAO. Turkey is still lobbying for a $ 1.5 bn pipeline from
the Caspian to the Mediterranean; but the preferred route through Armenia is blocked by
hostility to Turkey and war with Azer baijan,  a  spur through Iran might hit  Western
financing problems and a route through Georgia would be plagued by banditry. Turkey,
seeking prestige, transit fees and access to Eurasian oil and gas, is set against plans to
expand Trans -Russia pipelines to the Black Sea and made it clear that it will obstruct, by
all means, any increase in supertanker traffic through the crowded Bosphorus Strait. The
Turkish  government  argues  that  the  Bosphorus  would  be  further  congested  once  a
projected link between the Rhine and Danube rivers opens and in this case, the use of the
Bosphorus for oil and natural gas shipments will increase the risk of sea accidents and
will place navigation, environmental safety and physical security of Istanbul's 10 million
inhabitants under grave threat. The passage of large tankers would effectively close the
Straits to other shipping for long periods. It is worth noting that an average of 30.000
Turkish- and foreign-flagged ships sail through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles every year
and 60% are tankers, carrying oil, oil derivatives and chemicals56. Even if the government
bows to the foreign pressure, the Turkish environmentalists  declared that they would
move to the scene to block the passage of oil tankers through Istanbul.
74 BOTAŞ, the state-owned gas pipeline company, hopes that adding a Kazakh interest to the
Trans-Caucasus pipeline will raise its capacity from a projected annual 25 mmt to 40 mmt
and Turkmenistan, which currently favors a trans-Iranian export route for its gas, might
add a gas pipeline as well. The idea is to achieve a transportation capacity of 40 bcm per
year from Turkmenistan to the Caucasus, the Balkans and European countries. It seems
that  Turkey already received positive  answers  from Bulgaria,  Romania,  Hungary and
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Austria regarding this project, which proposes a route starting from Ashkabad crossing
the  Caspian  Sea,  and  going  through  Azerbaijan,  Armenia  and  Turkey  and  then  the
countries mentioned above. In Austria, the pipeline would link with the European gas
network. BOTAŞ considers the project in two stages : first, a pipeline and then, its twin.
The first line has an estimated cost of $ 8.5 bn. The second should cost less, around $ 5 bn,
since  most  of  the  infrastructural  work  and  engineering  would  be  carried  out  while
constructing the first  line.  The 4.800 km route proposed by Turkey is  the "shortest"
connecting  the  rich  Turkmen gas  fields  to  the European  markets57.  Turkmenistan
announced that it would be able to export 28 bcm of natural gas in 1993 and is looking for
alternative routes to the former Soviet gas network. On the other hand, since it shares a
long border with Turkmenistan, Iran is also well positioned to play a role in carrying
Turkmen gas to the Gulf over its territory. To reach the Indian Ocean via Pakistan is
another  alternative.  These two alternative routes  are  mainly  aimed at  supplying the
Japanese and other Southeast Asia-Pacific markets.  However,  the feasibility of  such a
route is very much in doubt for a variety of political and financial reasons. The route that
Turkey proposes and that has to wait for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, is aimed exclusively at meeting Europe's future natural gas demand.
75 Looking at the present state of affairs, Western oil analysts assert that, with prospects of
peace in the Caucasus  still  not  in  sight,  claims by Turkey's  leaders  that  the Eastern
Mediterranean port of Iskenderun is about to become the world's Second Gulf, with oil
and natural gas pouring south by pipeline from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to a major
new energy outlet - with the producer countries, international energy giants and Turkey
sharing the benefits - sound more like pipedreams than real prospects58. Is it realistic to
jump to such a quick conclusion?
76 True,  the  initial  pipeline  planned  to  take  Azerbaijani  oil  to  the  Mediter ranean  was
supposed to pass through Armenia and Iran. If a reliable and enduring solution to the
dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia cannot be found, it is hard to see one exporting
oil via the other. Under the present circumstances, the pipeline project via Iran remains
the only option (preferred by Azerbaijan a, well); but it touches on the sensitive nerves of
the Western investors. The BOTAŞ  director-general, Mr. Hayrettin Uzun, said that the
pipeline projects for transporting Caucasian and Central Asian oil to Europe had to be put
shelved59 due to continuing political instability in the region. Does this mean that Turkey,
Azerbaijan and the oil  companies have to go back to square one and reconsider the
'unthinkable'  alternatives  of  oil  tankers  queuing  up  in  the  Bosphorus  or  a  pipeline
diverted via Iran? Will the Eurasian republics simply seek outlets for their mineral wealth
via Russia? Turks appear to have made a practical analysis of the current circumstances.
There is a standstill in the pipeline project, but one thing has now become clear from the
insistence by Mr. Uzun of BOTAS, who bas repeated: "We are not going to allow the use of
the straits  for  large oil  tankers  as  we cannot  jeopardize  Istanbul"60 and,  in  a  bid  to
substantiate this warning and ignoring strong Russian protests, Turkey announced few
days later new regulations on the passage through the Straits, which became operational
from 1 July 1994.
77 Under  these  new regulations,  tankers  with  harmful  chemical  loads,  nuclear-powered
vessels or ships with nuclear-related material need to request prior permission from the
Turkish Ministry of  Environment to pass through.  A collision last  year in the Straits
between an oil tanker from Novorossiysk and a freighter demonstrated that the Turks'
concerns appear well founded. Experts believe that Ankara now prepared the legal case to
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deny passage to large oil  vessels through the Bosphorus,  or delay them by requiring
pilotage.  Governments  and  producers  must  be  aware  that  Ankara  and  particularly
Turkish environment groups could make life difficult for unwanted tanker traffic. Delays
tan cost huge sums of money. It is not only Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that have
to worry about the implications of such a Turkish action61. Bulgaria, Romania and the
Ukraine, too, are all exploring Black Sea waters. One suggestion is that the problem could
be solved by building a relatively short pipeline along the Bosphorus Straits and the Sea
of Marmara. However, such a project would add considerably to the costs of the northern
route and raise objections from Greece as tanker traffic would affect this time its islands
in the Aegean. To bypass the Turkish Straits,  the Russian government now insists on
Kazakh crude being routed through Novorossiysk, across the Black Sea and thence via a
pipeline  crossing  Bulgaria  and  ending  up  in  Greece.  On  the  other  hand,  Albania,
Macedonia and Bulgaria signed a protocol to study the potential for a new pipeline to
carry crude oil from the former Soviet Union to exit at Vlores on Albania's Adriatic toast.
The planned Trans-Balkan pipeline, too, aims to bypass Turkey's congested Bosphorus
exit from the Black Sea providing an alternative route, with a capacity to deliver 800.000
b/d of crude62.
78 A long-term measure would be to consider alternative oil transport routes from Eurasia
to the open seas so as to cut clown on tanker traffic through the Turkish Straits and to
enhance security of supplies. Mr. Sami Kohen, a diplomatic analyst, suggests that it may
be possible to transport the Eurasian oil and gas to the Russian port of Novorossysk by
pipeline, then to Samsun or any other port on Turkey's Black Sea toast and finally to
Iskenderun via a pipeline crossing Anatolia. This alternative would have both advantages
and disadvantages for Turkey and is not looked upon positively by key policy makers in
Ankara. A Turkish pipeline is seen as serving not only the flow of Kazakhs, Azeri and
Turkmen  energy  exports,  but  also  as  providing  growing  Russian  exports  with  an
alternative outlet. Under any circumstances, Turkey has been perceived as an important
player in the Eurasian energy 'game' and it is certainly in the best interests of all the
major players to co-operate in this positive sum game rather confront one another.
79 Whatever  the  obstacles  and  financial  risks,  they  will  eventually  be  overcome  and  a
Caspian  pipeline  will  be  built  because the  hydro-carbon  potential  of  Eurasia  is
tremendous, and it has to be shipped to the international markets. In fact the pipeline
contest is not entirely a zero-sum game and the longer-term future point a two-pipeline
solution for two simple reasons. First, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan find the
prospect attractive of two pipelines destined to a northern Russian port on the Black Sea
on the one hand, and a southern Turkish port on the Mediterranean on the other. None of
these  countries  want  to  be  completely  dependent  on  Russia,  yet  each  is  hesitant
(Kazakhstan more so) to rut Russia entirely out of the energy picture, risking a backlash.
Second,  the  first  project  that  emerges  as  the  solid  front-runner  (for  instance,  the
northern route of Kazakhstan) will pull capital away from the other (the Baku-Ceyhan
route of Azerbaijan) and it will pick up momentum. Then, money will flow less easily to
the second project. In this case, the producing country whose favored plan loses out will
have a sort of second-cases status in the prevailing pipeline, with its needs subordinate to
these of the other producer. One additional reason may be the worsening of the political
and economic crisis in Russia. If Moscow falls to play a constructive role in the Caspian
Pipeline  Consortium  and  the  regional  authorities  of  Southern  Russia  become  more
ambitious  vis-a-vis  their  own  role  in  the  project  and  if  Azerbaijan  reaches  a  stable
EURASIAN ENERGY PROSPECTS AND POLITICS : Need For a Fresh Perspective
Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, 19 | 2004
23
settlement with Armenia, which recent reports indicate may now be within reach, then
the  Turkish  pipeline  will  become  the  favored  option.  The  Chechnya  conflict,  which
rendered transit passage via Grozny unfeasible and the US political support extended to
the Baku-Ceyhan route reinforced Ankara's hopes for its pipeline project.
80 The task of adequately forecasting developments in the Eurasian region is more difficult
than it was in the past when one could at least assume a stable structure. Political and
economic instability has been the order of the day and energy is one important sector
adversely affected by this situation. No country has been able to achieve, or tan logically
expert  to  achieve,  energy  self -sufficiency  in  isolation  from  world  markets.  Energy
security tomes, not from insular self-sufficiency, but from healthy energy trade. Sound
markets are now understood to be the most certain source of secure energy supplies. The
energy  trade  has  evolved  from a  focus  on  long-term,  fixed  price,  fixed  volume and
exclusive contracts, to a set of flexible arrangements whereby market participants are
positioned to benefit from different and changing costs, from price changes, from shifts
in  supply  or  demand,  and  from new production  techniques  or  other  energy-related
technologies. One of the more important things that the West can share at this stage with
its Eurasian partners is precisely its experience in making this transition from less to
more market-oriented trading patterns.
81 To effect the successful transformation of the energy-using and -produ cing sectors, the
macro-economic framework must be structured to improve the investment climate and
balance  of  payments  pattern;  a  suitable  institutional  framework to  facilitate  a  rapid
market-determined  supply  response;  autonomous  and  market-oriented  energy-supply
enterprises, preferably in the private sector; improved energy efficiency; promotion of
foreign direct investment both in existing enterprises and in new ventures;  a careful
analysis of alternative trading options. Technical standards i.e. the quality of products
and  supply  reliability  must  be  improved;  and  a  viable  and  sound  infrastructure  -
pipelines, transmission lines, transport and port facilities - must be established. A well
balanced  or chestration  of  such  policy,  institutional  and  investment  actions  should
ultimately result in a considerable restructuring of the energy use and supply mix in the
region. This would entail a decrease of the use of coal and an increase in the use and the
exportation of oil and natural gas, particularly from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The
scenario would also involve increased trade among the countries of the region, as well as
changes in the pattern of supply from other countries.
82 It is widely held that the key to a successful reform and development in Eurasia would be
the  speedy  inflow  of  managerial  resources,  including  know- how,  licenses,  working
practices and management skill, from the West through foreign direct investment (FDI).
Besides the framework conditions,  such as  non -discriminatory treatment of  FDI,  free
remittance  of  earnings,  protection  of  investments,  transparent,  stable  laws  and
streamlined one-stop admission procedures, Western investors are after a good business
environment, political and social stability, an efficient banking system, guaranteed land
ownership or long-term leasehold by investors, an economically sustainable tax system
and well developed infrastructure of telecommunications and transportation. If all the oil
and gas resources are to be exploited and marketed, new pipelines will, in many cases,
have to be constructed. At the same time, the world tanker fleet needs renewing. And, as
demand for imported fuels increases in the West, new refineries will have to be built63.
Western capital and technology must be introduced as quickly as possible to rebuild the
oil and gas industries in the former Soviet republics. But although many joint ventures
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have been negotiated, few have actually got off the ground due to problems over resource
rights,  the  absence  of  a  legal  framework  for  investment,  inadequate  tax  systems,
confrontation between central and local governments, political turmoil and other factors.
83 One important question remaining is how much energy finance will be needed and from
where it will come. Investment in energy, especially hydrocarbon investment, is risky.
The investment timeframe is long-term, the demand projections are uncertain, there can
be  sharp  cyclical  swings,  taxes  and  other  costs  can  increase  unexpectedly  and  the
political background can change dramatically over the course of the investment. Over the
next 15 years, oil and gas companies estimate that they have to invest between $300-$400
billion in Europe to meet energy demand64. Between $985 billion and $1.6 trillion oil and
gas investments are required worldwide to meet  projected energy needs in the next
decade.  Commercial  banks,  supranational  development  batiks  and  the  public  capital
markets will  all  play a part in raising these billions of dollars required. A number of
foreign energy companies already jumped on the bandwagon to Central Asia and the
Trans-Caucasus.  They  are  comparing  risks  in  this  region  with  risks  in  Russia  and
elsewhere.
84 Typical risks in these countries include political instability, remoteness and difficulty of
developing  energy  reserves  in  some  regions,  Jack  of  experience  among  local
bureaucracies  in  doing  business  with  Western  companies,  and  ethnic  or  territorial
disputes  between  neighbors.  The  risks  in  Russia  are  of  the  same  range  but  its
opportunities are comparatively vast: the energy resources of Russia are by far larger
than those of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, while the latter countries are mostly
landlocked and are largely a desert populated by more than 100 different communities,
the  Russian  Federation  has  far  bigger  problems  as  well  as  huge  risks.  Risks  and
opportunities  also  range  from  local  rivalries  to  regional  blocs  competing  with  one
another. All in all,  one can confidently argue that, for Western investors, Eurasia is a
largely unexploited virgin land, where future gains will be more important than short-
sighted  risk  calculations.  Nevertheless,  initial  support  must  come  from  Western
governments and multilateral banks. In facts, governments at present provide or broker
the bulk of infrastructure financing: about 90% of financial flows for infrastructure are
channelled through a government sponsor,  which bears almost all  project risks.  Only
then will private investors follow suit. Many foreign investors will hold back in mega-
projects until multilateral agencies such as the Word Bank and the EBRD lead the way. In
the final analysis, we believe that it is truly a win-win situation for both sides if emotions
and short-term political considerations are restrained.
85 The Eurasian nations are facing truly tough decisions in the next several years over their
energy policy. They must carefully tread a balance along the thin line of politics and
economics of oil and gas. They must become realistic in their investment plans. They
must base their decisions on economic necessities and, above all, they must learn to live
with each other and their neighbors with a view to joint projects which will enhance their
future  energy  prospects.  Bearing  in  mind  the  predominance  of  Russian  oil  and  the
current  heavy  infrastructural  dependence  of  the  Eurasians  on  their  big  northern
neighbor,  it  would  be  ap propriate  to  suggest  that  any  sizeable  investment  and  co-
operation projects with the former Soviet republics be carefully coordinated, at least in
the  immediate  future,  with  the  Russian  Federation65.  This  would  ensure  the  smooth
functioning and economic viability of such projects since the nature of the infrastructure
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such as refineries, crude and product pipelines, depots, terminals and maintenance, will
require a relatively strong link to be maintained between Russia and other republics.
86 However, some quarters in the West are seriously concerned that a revival of Russian
imperialism is in the offing. Russia and the West may be once again on a collision course66.
The issue is the threatening Russian policy towards the other states of the former Soviet
Union:  are  the  Russians  entitled to  meddle  there  or  are  they not?  President  Yeltsin
explicitly asked the U.N. "to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and
stability  in  the  former  countries  of  the  USSR".  This  is  a  'Monroesky'  doctrine,  a
declaration  that  in  the  21st  century  the  former  Soviet  Union  is  Russia's  sphere  of
influence, just as in the 19th century James Monroe declared that the Americas were the
United States's. More recently, one of the main issues at the Budapest meeting of the
CSCE was Russia's demand that the 'near abroad', as it patronisingly calls its ex -Soviet
neighbors, should in effect be recognized as a Russian sphere of influence. Russia wanted
the CSCE's western members to let the Commonwealth of Independent States act as the
region's peacekeeping force. Since Russia dominates the CIS, which encompasses 12 of the
15 former republics of the Soviet Union, that would have restored the Kremlin much of
the power that it had in Brezhnev's day. The CSCE demurred, and instead decided that
troops under its own control should be dispatched to Nagorno-Karabakh. The CSCE force
will be the first international peacekeepers to be sent to the former Soviet Union. Over
the past few months, Russian policy in the 'near abroad' has subtly shifted. According to
The Economist67, the 'sabre-rattling' of involvement is ending, giving way to what might
be called an arm-twisting federalism. Both policies aim to project Russian power. The
difference is one of emphasis and means: the new policy stresses economic (particularly
energy) pressure rather than military intervention, trade rather than destabilisation, a
manipulation of local rivalries rather than a straight imposition of Russian will.  Why
Russia or some Russians are interfering in the affairs of the former Soviet republics is mot
difficult to guess. No colonial power, from Darius to de Gaulle, has ever voluntarily and
peacefully relinquished its previous sphere of influence and the crumbling of the Russian-
led  Soviet  Empire  is  yet  another  case  of  painful  decolonization68.  Rosenfeld  of  The
Washington Post69 believes that what is happening in Russia is not an advance to a post-
Communist version of the Cold War, but a return to a pre-Communist version of a 19th
century balance-of-power national -interest world. We see this in its internal debates on
the traditional Westernizer-versus-Slavophile theme and in its policies in Europe, Bosnia,
Iraq, Chechnya and the rest.
87 The Eurasian countries and their infant petro-economy are particularly vulnerable to a
more  aggressive  Russian  foreign  policy70.  The  region,  from the  Black  Sea  to  China's
western borders, is threatened on various levels by the philosophy advocated by the so-
called liberal democratic leader,  Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whose neo-fascist party won a
large bloc of seats in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. The revival of imperial
and big power behaviors in Russia's relations with the other successor states can only
produce additional friction because there is an almost natural reaction to a century-old
experience of the non-Russian peoples of being mere object in Russia's imperial policy.
The  latest  Russian  military  intervention  in  Chechnya,  despite  calls  for  peaceful
settlement, fueled further fears elsewhere in the NIS area. Moscow insists that Central
Asia and the Caucasus remain a strategic asset, an area from which it can exert influence
over the oil-rich regions of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, as well as southern
Europe.  Russians  are  in  turn  worried  about  the  still  widespread  phobia  of  'Muslim
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fundamentalism',  the  spill-over  of  conflicts  from the  'near  abroad'  into  the  Russian
Federation, where 15 million Muslim believers inhabit, and the uncertain plight of the
Russian minority living in Eurasia.
88 Given the inflammatory situation in the former Soviet geography, the responsibility of all
those involved requires that the future of Eurasia is shaped as peacefully as possible. The
West can help the new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union through a pro-
active policy of cautious and balanced influence. The Eurasian republics should not be left
on their  own,  but  must  be supported politically  and economically  in their  efforts  to
develop new, alternative (other than Russian) links in opening up to the outside world.
Only then will they be able to enjoy co-operative relationship with Russia on an equal
footing. Oth erwise, Russia might perceive the current indifference of the West to what
happens  in  Tajikistan,  Abkhazia,  Ossetia,  Trans-Dniester,  Azerbaijan and Crimea as  a
"green light" to their self-declared sphere of influence.  Reducing the historical  semi-
colonial dependence of the Eurasians on Moscow should be the first step in this direction.
This  would  entail  mobilizing  the  republics'  indigenous  natural  and  entrepreneurial
resources, promoting foreign investment and trade, especially through the creation of
logistical trade and transport corridors and encouraging them to help themselves. It is
correct  that  the  internal  dynamics  of  the  EU  foreign  policy-making  and  various
constraints i.e. finances, conflicting national interests among member states, competition
with other policy areas and geographical priorities (Eastern & Central Europe and the
Mediterranean), are currently holding back the development of an effective EU policy
response towards Eurasia. But, at a time when there are quite a number of major external
players in the region competing with each other, we believe that the EU cannot afford to
stand idly on the sidelines or be indifferent economically and politically to this important
geography.  It  should join forces  with the  regional  countries  in  designing a  political,
economic  and  security  strategy  in  which  energy  diplomacy  is  destined  to  play  an
increasingly important role.  Such a strategy must also ensure strong support for the
continuing transformation of Russia itself towards greater democracy and a free market
economy. In terms of energy security, new investment opportunities, regional stability
and security, it would be in the best interests of the EU to hammer out a longer-term
strategy, instead of its current piecemeal and mainly commerce-driven approach, toward
the Eurasian reality.
89 The  moderating  of  oil  nationalism  is  moving  producing  countries  towards  a  more
commercial approach to their natural resources. Oil is being seen more as an economic
asset than a political asset. Nevertheless, there are still reasons to be skeptical about the
security  of  energy  supplies.  The  biggest  threat  to  energy  security  comes  from  the
possibility of oil once again being used as a weapon to achieve specific political objectives.
Such a situation would be extremely conceivable should a dictator like Saddam Hussein
expand his control over the region's oil fields or a succession of anti-western Islamic
parties come to power in oil-producing countries.
90 To prevent this happening, countries like Turkey, which is seen as a Western, secular,
democratic, free market-oriented and bas special ties to the region and the West, are
needed  as  ally  partners  in  formulating  and  executing  the  overall  Western  strategy
towards the Middle East and Eurasia. But Ankara frustrated by lack of sufficient support
from the West is now underlining that its co-operation should not be taken for granted as
in the part. In the post-Cold War era, energy will be one of the most important areas in
which  Turkey's  future  role  in  the  international  system  will  be  determined.  Recent
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geopolitical changes have placed Turkey at the epicenter of a new economic and political
reality in Eurasia, and Turkey's policy of promoting Eurasia as a region of peace, stability
and prosperity would be all the more effective and conclusive if supported by its Western
partners. With the relative dynamism of the Turkish economy, these contacts may open
up new possibilities for the EU countries, at the time of economic recession at home, to
co-operate in joint ventures targeted at both Turkey's large 60 million-strong internal
market  and  those  of  its  regional  partners.  Triangular  partnerships,  including  other
countries in the Black Sea region and Central Asia, offer additional advantages which
would  reduce  the  risks  of  direct  investment  there.  Turkish-led  regional  integration
initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) and the Economic Co-
operation Organization (ECO), whose membership include most Eurasians, should also be
considered in this context for joint efforts.
91 Above  all,  Turkey  has  a  broad  strategy  interest  in  securing  the  Caspian  pipeline  to
Yumurtalik.  This  overriding  political  and  economic  interest  has,  according  to  some
Western analysts,  several components.  First,  the transit fees will  leave Turkey with a
significant portion of the rent generated by Caspian-area oil exports. Second, if Turkey
establishes itself as the guarantor of Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's future oil wealth, its
long-term influence  in  those  countries  will  be  solidified.  Third,  it  would  provide  an
extremely solid basis for long-term relations with the Turkic republics and guard against
the possibility that Turkey could be shut out of the area by a revived and aggressive
Russia, as it has been in the part. Fourth, Turkey does not want the Bosphorus to become
a supertanker  expressway in  the  middle  of  its  largest  city.  Finally,  Turkey's  five  oil
refineries, which have over 250.000 bd in spare capacity, could also be fed by Caspian-area
crude. Russia, too, would benefit from the alternative pipeline since spare would then be
freed in Russia's export lines for extra Russian oil  and gas.  In a nutshell,  geography,
economics, diplomacy and culture are all inseparably linked in the Eurasian equation and
now compels the West to adopt a multi-faceted approach in forging ties with Turkey and
new market economies of Eurasia. The EU is currently faced with the difficult problem of
achieving greater integration of Turkey into its institutional framework and, as Italian
analyst Roberto Aliboni warns, must be careful not to assume that by giving Turkey an
international  'Turkish'  role it  will  necessarily be compatible with European interests.
Hence it is important to underscore at every instance where mutual interests of Turkey
and the EU converge as far as Eurasia is concerned.
92 We believe that the time has come for the West to make fundamental  choices about
dealings with the post-Soviet challenge. The new geopolitical situation arising from the
collapse of the former enemy offers a mix of enormous opportunities and tremendous
risks. The hard Tact is that the Eurasians will not be able to make a smooth transition on
their own. The rate of progress in developing and transporting their energy resources
will depend to a great extent on political stability and on how much help is provided from
both private and public sources in the West. As Simes rightly points out, during ordinary
times the politics of nations - particularly such great nations as Russia - can be only
marginally affected from the outside. During periods of great transformation, however,
with  all  their  concomitant  volatility  and  turmoil,  input from  abroad  can  make  an
enormous  difference71.  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  the  West  in  general  and  the  EU  in
particular have great stakes in, and can influence, the final outcome. Energy is, in our
judgement, the single most important area of co-operation in the post-Cold War Eurasia
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